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We use robust control techniques to study the eects of model uncertainty on mon-
etary policy in a small-open-economy model estimated on Australian data. Compared
to the closed economy, the presence of open-economy transmission channels and shocks
not only produces new trade-os for monetary policy, but also introduces additional
sources of specication errors. We nd that price markup shocks in the domestic
and import sector are important contributors to volatility in the model, and that the
domestic and import sector Phillips curves are particularly vulnerable to model mis-
specication. On the other hand, deviations from the interest rate parity condition
do not contribute much to overall volatility, nor is the parity condition especially vul-
nerable to misspecication. Our results suggest that it may be more important for
central banks in small open economies to understand the nature of price setting and
the eects of exchange rate movements on the economy than the determination of the
exchange rate itself.
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Although the canonical New Keynesian model (Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Gal ,
and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2003)) is used extensively to analyze monetary policy,
important questions about its structure remain unresolved. There are ongoing debates
about the role of forward-looking ination expectations, about the nature of the driving
variable|real marginal cost or an output gap|in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and
about the importance of habit formation and consumption smoothing in the forward-looking
\IS" curve. More generally, it is widely perceived among practitioners that monetary policy
aects the economy with \long and variable lags" in ways that models generally do not
acknowledge.
Of course, these debates about the appropriate structure of closed-economy New Key-
nesian models apply equally to open-economy specications. After all, the transmission
mechanisms that operate in open-economy models are often similar to those present in
closed-economy specications. However, unlike in the closed economy, in the open econ-
omy there can be concerns about the level of exchange rate pass-through, concerns centered
around whether pass-through is full or partial, and about the extent to which imports are
consumed or employed as intermediate inputs in the production of domestic goods. Simi-
larly, exchange rate dynamics are dicult to model and from an empirical standpoint there
is good reason to view uncovered interest rate parity with suspicion. Importantly, these con-
cerns extend beyond parameter uncertainty, amounting to a concern about the very structure
of the model used to describe the economy.
We study the conduct of monetary policy in a model of a small open economy developed
by Justiniano and Preston (2008) and estimated on Australian data. Unlike most papers that
consider the design of monetary policy in open-economy contexts, we introduce a concern
for model misspecication on the part of the central bank and focus on policy rules that
have been formulated purposefully to be robust to model misspecication. In the tradition
of Hansen and Sargent (2008), we assume that the central bank possesses a benchmark
model of the economy, which it is concerned may be misspecied, but that it is unwilling to
posit a probability distribution over possible specication errors. The central bank allows
for specication errors that lie within a neighborhood of its benchmark specication and
conducts monetary policy to guard against the worst-case specication error. In taking this
approach, the central bank recognizes that its policy will be suboptimal if its benchmark
model is actually specied correctly, but it still conducts policy this way, gaining comfort
from the knowledge that by doing so it is insuring against catastrophic outcomes.
The open-economy model that we consider is based on the theoretical model of Monacelli
(2005). The model allows households to consume goods produced both domestically and
1abroad, with sticky prices in both the domestic and the import sector. Sticky import prices
imply that exchange rate movements do not feed directly through to consumer prices, that
is, exchange rate pass-through is incomplete. The model also allows a portfolio allocation
choice between domestic and foreign bonds, giving rise to an uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) condition and making the exchange rate an important channel for monetary policy
and risk premium shocks an important source of economic volatility. As we show, the
exchange rate channel introduces additional trade-os that the central bank must acknowl-
edge when formulating policy, and it introduces an additional location for possible model
misspecication.
We contrast the sources of misspecication and the design of robust monetary policy with
commitment by using several versions of our model: a closed-economy version, a version with
open-economy transmission channels, but only domestic shocks, and versions with shocks
emanating from the open-economy components of the model. We show that in a closed
economy, a robust central bank should be concerned mainly with specication errors to
the ination equation (or Phillips curve). Adding open-economy transmission channels
and shocks, we nd that the relationship describing import price ination is an important
source of volatility and that it is also particularly prone to model misspecication. In
contrast, shocks to the UIP condition are not a very important source of volatility, nor is
the UIP condition particularly vulnerable to model misspecication. Thus, analogous to
a closed economy, a central bank in a small open economy that is worried about model
misspecication should be concerned mainly about the domestic and import sector Phillips
curves. These results suggest that it may be more important for central banks in small
open economies to understand the nature of price setting and the impact of exchange rate
movements on import prices (that is, the degree of exchange rate pass-through) than the
determination of the exchange rate itself and possible deviations from uncovered interest
rate parity.
Our approach to robust monetary policy assumes that the central bank formulates policy
to minimize the economic consequences of the worst-case specication errors. An alternative
approach is for the central bank to build several models and to use these models to develop
a policy that produces reasonable, if not optimal, outcomes in all of the models (Levin,
Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003)). Although this approach is intuitive and simple to
implement, it is not necessarily the most attractive. The approach does not allow the
central bank to address any concerns it may have about parameter uncertainty, it does
not accommodate the possibility that agents other than the central bank may be concerned
about model uncertainty, and it assumes that each of the models provides an equally plausible
description of the economy. A second alternative is for the central bank to take a Bayesian
approach, estimating a range of models and using Bayesian model averaging to evaluate
2competing policies (see Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007) and Batini, Justiniano, Levine,
and Pearlman (2005)). The Bayesian approach does not assume that all of the models are
equally plausible and it readily accommodates both parameter and model uncertainty, but it
still does not easily allow all agents in the model to be concerned about model uncertainty.
In contrast, the robust control approach has the advantages that the policymaker need
only develop a single model and all agents in the economy can be concerned about model
misspecication. Furthermore, the specication errors can reect both model and parameter
uncertainty.
Although model uncertainty|particularly uncertainty concerning exchange rate determi-
nation|is of obvious relevance for central banks in small open economies (see, for instance,
West (2003)), surprisingly few studies have examined the issue. Leitemo and S oderstr om
(2005) study the robustness of simple policy rules to uncertainty about exchange rate deter-
mination in a calibrated, stylized, small-open-economy model, concluding that a standard
Taylor rule that responds to CPI ination and the output gap performs well. They also
argue that the Taylor rule is more robust to uncertainty about the formation of exchange rate
expectations than are rules that respond to exchange rate movements. Batini, Justiniano,
Levine, and Pearlman (2005) study the eects of Bayesian model uncertainty on monetary
policy in an estimated two-country model. Unlike our study, they focus on large open
economies and investigate the gains to policy coordination. Justiniano and Preston (2008)
analyze the eects of parameter uncertainty on optimized Taylor-type rules for monetary
policy in the model used here, but estimated on data not only from Australia, but also
from Canada, and New Zealand. Using a Bayesian approach, they nd that parameter
uncertainty has small eects on the optimized monetary policy rules.
These papers all study specic types of model uncertainty without allowing private agents
to have doubts about model specication. In contrast, we study more general forms of model
uncertainty using robust control techniques that allow the central bank to formulate a policy
that accommodates the eect model misspecication may have on private agents. Along
similar lines, Lees (2006) analyzes a stylized small-open-economy model and nds that robust
policies are generally more aggressive in response to shocks and that they imply less interest
rate inertia. For his calibration and with discretionary policy, Lees (2006) concludes that
the exchange rate is an important source of specication errors, and that the consequences of
these specication errors outweigh the benets to the central bank of exploiting the exchange
rate channel to stabilize the economy. We instead study optimal policy with commitment
within a completely microfounded model. We show that with policy set under commitment,
misspecication in exchange rate determination is not very damaging. Finally, Leitemo and
S oderstr om (2008b) present an analytic treatment of robust control in a minimalist small-
open-economy model. They show that by guarding against specication errors in either the
3supply or demand side of the model the central bank raises the volatility of output and the
exchange rate, whereas by guarding against specication errors in the exchange rate equation
the central bank raises the volatility of ination. We study a more general estimated model,
with inertia in consumption and ination, that is better suited to quantifying the eects of
robustness in the small open economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We rst describe the model in
Section 2. We then present our robust control algorithm in Section 3. We apply this
algorithm to dierent versions of the model in Section 4, isolating the eects on robust
policymaking of the open-economy policy channels and the open-economy shocks before
studying the complete open-economy specication. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
Our model is based on the New Keynesian small-open-economy model developed by Jus-
tiniano and Preston (2008), who extend the theoretical model of Monacelli (2005). In this
model households consume goods produced both domestically and abroad, with staggered
price-setting in both the domestic and the import sector. With imported goods subject
to price rigidity, and with importers pricing to market, the model can reproduce the in-
complete exchange rate pass-through widely found to characterize the behavior of imported
goods prices following exchange rate shocks (Campa and Goldberg (2005)). As there is am-
ple evidence supporting incomplete exchange rate pass-through, allowing for sticky imported
goods prices seems reasonable, especially since it is likely to be important for the design of
monetary policy. A second key feature of the model is that it is not possible to achieve
full price stability by setting the output gap to zero. The interest rate policy required to
generate a zero output gap destabilizes ination through its inuence on imported goods
prices.
The theoretical specication of Monacelli (2005) provides a simple microfounded descrip-
tion of private-sector behavior in an economy where goods prices are sticky. However, the
model abstracts from the information and decision lags that can give rise to gradual adjust-
ments and inertial responses to shocks. Justiniano and Preston (2008) therefore extend the
model to allow for partial indexation of prices to ination and habits in consumer preferences.
The model features ve groups of agents: households, domestic-good rms, import rms,
a central bank, and a foreign sector. We here only present the main characteristics of the
model and the log-linearized equations. The reader is referred to Justiniano and Preston
(2008) for more detail.
Households consume a basket containing both domestically produced and imported goods,
save in nominal one-period bonds denoted in domestic or foreign currency, and supply la-
4bor to rms in the domestic sector. Household utility depends positively on consumption
relative to an external habit stock and negatively on labor supply. When saving in foreign
bonds, households pay an interest rate premium that depends on the domestic economy's
net foreign asset position.
Denoting by ct aggregate consumption, by rt the interest rate on domestic nominal one-
period bonds, and by t  pt   pt 1 the rate of consumer price ination (where pt is the
logarithm of the consumer price level), the household's intertemporal optimization problem
leads to the consumption Euler equation
ct   hct 1 = Etct+1   hct  
1   h








t is a preference (or, equivalently, a discount factor) shock, h determines the im-
portance of habits in consumption, and  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal













Letting et denote the nominal exchange rate and p
t the foreign price level, the real
exchange rate qt is given by
qt = et + p

t   pt: (3)
The household's choice between purchasing domestic or foreign bonds then implies the real
interest rate parity condition













t are the one-period nominal interest rate and the ination rate in the foreign
economy, at is the domestic economy's net foreign asset position,  is the elasticity of the
foreign exchange risk premium to the net foreign asset position, and u
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t is a risk premium

























where  is the household's discount factor and  is the fraction of imported goods in the
household's consumption basket.
There is a continuum of domestic rms producing dierentiated goods under monopolistic
competition using labor as the only input. These rms set prices in a staggered fashion,
5following Calvo (1983), so only a fraction 1  d of rms reset their prices optimally in each
period. The remaining fraction partially index their prices to the previous period's ination

























where t is real marginal cost, and "d
t is a shock to rms' markup over marginal cost.1
Combining the expression for marginal cost in the domestic sector with the optimal labor
supply decision gives





= 'yt   (1 + ')u
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t + 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
1   h
[ct   hct 1]; (8)
where wt is the nominal wage, pd
t is the price of domestic goods, ua



















and ' is the inverse elasticity of labor supply.
There is also a continuum of rms importing goods from abroad under monopolistic
competition. Marginal cost in the import sector is simply the domestic currency price of
foreign goods, et + p
t, but the pricing power of import rms leads to short-run deviations
from the law of one price, so p
f
t 6= et + p
t. As in the domestic sector, import rms also
set prices in a staggered fashion, but with Calvo parameter f and indexation parameter f.














(1   f)(1   f)
f(1 + f)
 t + u
f
t ; (11)
where  t is the deviation from the law of one price, given by





1This markup shock is not included in the original model by Justiniano and Preston (2008). However, as
such a shock has important implications for monetary policy in a closed economy, and we want to compare
the closed-economy policy implications to the open economy, we choose to include this shock in our model.
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We dene the CPI ination rate as







t + st: (14)
We can then write the law-of-one-price gap  t as
 t = qt   (1   )st: (15)
Market clearing implies that domestic output is determined by




t is output in the foreign economy, and  is the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported goods.
And nally, as the economy is small, the foreign economy (foreign ination, output, and
































































To parameterize the model, we use the estimates obtained by Justiniano and Preston
(2008) using quarterly Australian data from 1984:I to 2007:I. For the foreign economy, they
use U.S. data for the same period. These parameter estimates are shown in Tables 1{2.2
When estimating the model, Justiniano and Preston assume that monetary policy follows a
Taylor-type rule, that includes CPI ination, the level and growth rate of domestic output,
and the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation. We will instead assume that the central
bank sets monetary policy to minimize a quadratic loss function.
Viewed as a system, two features of the model are worth highlighting. First, the model
does not allow a permanent trade-o between ination and output, a knife-edge result that
could easily be overturned if either equation (7) or equation (11) were misspecied. Second,
it is movements in the law-of-one-price gap that are critical for output and ination, not
2We are grateful to Alejandro Justiniano and Bruce Preston for providing the exact parameter values.
For the domestic markup shock, which was not included by Justiniano and Preston, we rely on an estimated
standard deviation taken from Adolfson, Las een, Lind e, and Villani (2008) using Swedish data.
7movements in either the real exchange rate or the terms of trade. As a consequence,
the model, as it stands, does not uniquely pin down steady-state values for either the real
exchange rate or the terms of trade (the UIP condition has important implications for the
change in the real exchange rate, but not for its level). Similarly, equation (15) shows that
many combinations of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade are consistent with any
given value of the law-of-one-price gap variable. Therefore, depending on how monetary
policy is conducted, transitory shocks can have permanent eects on the real exchange rate
and the terms of trade.
3 The robust control algorithm
When designing monetary policy, the central bank is assumed to use the estimated model
in equations (1){(17) as its \reference model," the model it believes best describes the data-
generating process. However, the central bank fears that this reference model is misspecied,
and therefore uses robust control methods to formulate monetary policy. As emphasized
by Hansen and Sargent (2008), robust control allows the central bank to design a policy
that guards purposefully against specication errors, or distortions, to the reference model
that are \small" in the sense that the distorted model lies in a neighborhood \close" to
the reference model. In formulating the central bank's robust control problem, we deviate
slightly from Hansen and Sargent (2008) and allow the central bank to fear misspecication
of both the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the shock processes. Alter-
natively, our setup can be interpreted as the situation where the central bank sets policy
before observing the shocks, while in the Hansen-Sargent setup, the central bank sets policy
after observing the shocks.
Our robust control algorithms build on Dennis (2007) and Dennis, Leitemo, and S oder-
str om (2008). These algorithms allow the optimization constraints to be written in a
structural form as
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2Etyt+1 + A3ut + A4"t; (18)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, ut is a vector of policy instrument(s), vt is a
vector of specication errors, "t is a vector of innovations, and A0, A1, A2, A3, and A4 are
matrices conformable with yt, ut, and "t that contain the parameters of the model. The
matrix A0 is assumed to be nonsingular and the elements of A4 are determined to ensure
that the shocks are distributed according to "t  i:i:d:[0;I]. The dating convention is such
that any variable that enters yt 1 is predetermined, known by the beginning of period t.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), the central bank's fear of misspecication is formal-
ized by introducing specication errors to each equation in which there is a shock. To help
8it devise a robust policy, the central bank assumes that where it desires to minimize a loss
function, a ctitious \evil agent" strategically chooses the specication errors to maximize
the loss function. To obtain the distorted model, we rst introduce the expectational er-
rors, "yt+1  yt+1  Etyt+1, which will be a linear function of the innovations in equilibrium,
"yt+1 = C"t+1, and write equation (18) in terms of realizations as
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2yt+1 + A3ut + A4"t   A2C"t+1; (19)
where the matrix C has yet to be determined. Next, equation (19) is surrounded with a
class of distorted models of the form
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2yt+1 + A3ut + A4 (vt + "t)   A2C(vt+1 + "t+1); (20)







tvt  ; (21)
where  2 [0;) represents the total \budget" for misspecication.










where W and Q contain policy weights and are assumed to be symmetric positive-semidenite
and symmetric positive-denite, respectively. The parameter  2 (0;1) is the central bank's
discount factor.
Hansen and Sargent (2008) show that the problem of minimizing equation (22) with
respect to ut and maximizing with respect to vt subject to equations (20) and (21) can be












is minimized with respect to ut and maximized with respect to vt, subject to equation (20).
The parameter  2 (;1] represents the shadow price of a marginal relaxation of the con-
straint in equation (21) and is inversely related to the budget for misspecication, .
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9where the vector t contains the Lagrange multipliers on the distorted model.
The rst order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to t, yt, ut, and vt are
@L
@t
: A1yt 1 + A2Etyt+1 + A3ut + A4 (vt + "t)   A2CEtvt+1   A0yt = 0; (25)
@L
@yt







0t = 0; (26)
@L
@ut
: Rut + A
0
3t = 0; (27)
@L
@vt
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y yt 1 + K
W
" "t: (32)
The solution to this robust control problem yields the central bank's \worst-case" equi-
librium, the equilibrium in which the worst-case specication errors are realized, the central
bank employs its robust decision rule, and private agents form expectations acknowledging
the central bank's fear of misspecication. Once the worst-case equilibrium has been ob-
tained, it is straightforward to obtain the \approximating" equilibrium, in which the central
bank employs its robust decision rule and private agents form expectations acknowledging
the central bank's fear of misspecication, but the reference model transpires to be specied
correctly.
To obtain the worst-case equilibrium we update C according to C   NW
y and iterate








ut = Fzzt 1 + F""t; (34)
vt = Kzzt 1 + K""t: (35)




ut = Fzzt 1 + F""t; (37)
10is then obtained by solving equation (18) jointly with equations (28) and (31).
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), we determine the set of admissible specication
errors by selecting the central bank's preference for robustness to generate a particular
\detection error probability," the probability that an econometrician would infer incorrectly
whether the approximating equilibrium or the worst-case equilibrium generated the observed
data. The intuitive connection between  and the probability of making a detection error
is that when  is small, greater dierences between the distorted model and the reference
model (more severe misspecications) can arise, which are more easily detected. Let model
A denote the approximating model and model W denote the worst-case model. Then the





where prob(AjW) (prob(WjA)) represents the probability that the econometrician erro-
neously chooses model A (model W) when in fact model W (model A) generated the data.
To calculate the detection error probability for a given , we assume that the selection
of one model over another is based on the likelihood ratio principle. Therefore, with fzW
t gT
1
denoting a nite sequence of economic outcomes generated by the worst-case equilibrium,
model W, and LAW and LWW denoting the likelihood associated with models A and W,
respectively, then the econometrician chooses model A over model W if log(LWW=LAW) < 0.
Generating M independent sequences fzW
t gT




















AW) < 0] is an indicator function that equals one when its argument
is satised and equals zero otherwise; prob(WjA) is calculated analogously using draws
generated from the approximating model. The likelihood function that is generally used to
calculate prob(AjW) and prob(WjA) assumes that the innovations are normally distributed.
To calculate detection error probabilities while accounting for the distortions to both the











govern equilibrium outcomes under the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case equi-
librium, respectively. When NA 6= NW, to calculate p() we must rst allow for the stochas-
tic singularity that generally characterizes equilibrium and second account appropriately for
the Jacobian of transformation that enters the likelihood function. Using the QR decompo-
sition, we decompose NA according to NA = QARA and NW according to NW = QWRW.
11By construction, QA and QW are orthogonal matrices (Q0
AQA = Q0
WQW = I) and RA and
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where \tr" is the trace operator.
Given equations (43) and (44), equation (39) is used to estimate prob(AjW) and (sim-
ilarly) prob(WjA), which are needed to construct the detection error probability, as per
equation (38). The multiplier, , is then determined by selecting a detection error prob-
ability (or at least its lower bound) and inverting equation (38). Generally this inversion
is performed numerically by constructing the mapping between  and the detection error
probability, for a given sample size.
4 Robust monetary policy
We now study the properties of robust monetary policy in our model of the Australian
economy. We assume that the central bank's goals are to stabilize four-quarter CPI ination,
 t 
P3
j=0 t j; the level of output, yt; and the annualized quarterly interest rate, ~ rt  4rt,
around their long-run steady-state levels. The central bank's objectives are summarized by
















where we set  = 0:99,  = 0:5, and  = 0:1. These weights imply that the economy under
the non-robust policy displays uctuations similar to the data used for estimation.3
We focus on the case where monetary policy and the specication errors are chosen with
commitment. We then apply our robust control algorithm to construct the robust monetary
policy that guards against distortions to the reference model described by equations (1){(17).
3More specically, in Australian data from 1984:I to 2007:I, the standard deviations of annualized quar-
terly ination, detrended GDP, the rate of real exchange rate depreciation and the short-term interest rate
are, respectively, 2.73, 1.98, 4.72, and 1.09 percentage points. In the model with the optimal non-robust
policy with commitment, these standard deviations are 2.00, 1.48, 4.64, and 1.14.
12To isolate the eects of the transmission channels/shocks that are specic to the open
economy, we rst analyze a \pseudo-closed" version of the model, eliminating all open-
economy elements by setting the open-economy parameters and shocks to zero. This exercise
establishes the eects of robust monetary policy in a closed economy, providing a benchmark
against which to compare the open-economy results. We then proceed by systematically
adding open-economy elements to the reference model.
For each specication, we compare the outcomes of the rational expectations equilib-
rium (RE), the worst-case equilibrium (WO), and the approximating equilibrium (AP).
Throughout, we choose the central bank's preference for robustness so that the detection
error probability equals 0:2, calculated using 1;000 simulated samples of 200 observations.
This detection error probability allows the distortions to the reference model to be of a rea-
sonable magnitude, but not so large as to make it inconceivable that they would not have
been detected previously.
4.1 Robust monetary policy in a \pseudo-closed" economy
We rst analyze the \pseudo-closed" version of our model. To do this, we shut down all











































[yt   hyt 1]; (48)
where we have used the fact that yt = ct in the closed economy.
Figure 1 shows how key variables in the model respond to impulses to the three shocks:
to technology, consumer preferences, and the markup of domestic prices over marginal cost.
Consider rst the responses under the non-robust policy (or rational expectations), repre-
sented by the solid lines. A positive technology shock lowers marginal cost and ination,
and at the same time increases output. As a response, monetary policy is rst tightened
to reduce output, and then expanded to oset the fall in ination. A positive preference
shock raises consumption and output, which increases marginal cost and therefore ination.
The central bank therefore tightens policy, and output, marginal cost and ination return
to steady state after a period of overshooting. While the preference shock has very small
eects on the economy, the impact of the technology shock is substantially larger. The tech-
nology shock does not, however, create a serious tradeo for the central bank, as it tends to
move output and ination in opposite directions, which over time act to oset each other.
In contrast, the third shock, the price markup shock, has large eects on the economy and
13creates an important policy tradeo. A positive markup shock increases ination, forcing
the central bank to reduce output and marginal cost by raising the interest rate. Ination
then falls back toward steady state with some overshooting.
When we introduce a preference for robustness, the central bank typically fears that the
economy will uctuate more in response to the shocks, as well as to the policy response.
For the consumption preference shock, the eects of robustness are not great, as this shock
already has a small impact on the economy. Following a technology shock, on the other hand,
the robust central bank fears very large movements in output, marginal cost, and ination,
and responds by a much more aggressive movements in the interest rate. Following a price
markup shock, the central bank fears that the impact on ination will be larger than in
the reference model, and responds with a more aggressive policy tightening, which leads to
larger declines in output and marginal costs.
Panel (a) of Table 3 reports the unconditional standard deviations of key variables and
the value of the loss function under the non-robust and robust policies. Overall, the robust
central bank fears that ination and output will be much more volatile than they are in
the reference model, leading to more volatilty also in the interest rate. With the robust
policy (in the approximating equilibrium), the standard deviation of output is almost double
that with rational expectations, and the volatility of ination and the interest rate are also
substantially higher. Under the robust policy, the value of the loss function almost doubles.
To illustrate the size of specication errors in the worst-case model, Panel (a) of Table 4
shows the variances of these errors and Table 5 shows the eects on the variances of the
structural shocks. Since the price markup shock creates the most dicult tradeo for the
central bank, the distortions to this shock are considerably larger than those to the other two
shocks. This is also illustrated by the distorted variances of the structural shocks, where
there is a sizeable impact only on the variance of the price markup shock.
Thus, the robust central bank in this pseudo-closed economy should mainly worry about
specication errors to the ination equation. The cost of insuring against this misspecica-
tion comes in the form of greater volatility in the interest rate and output. These results are
qualitatively similar to those reached by Dennis, Leitemo, and S oderstr om (2008), who ex-
amine a related closed-economy model, and by Leitemo and S oderstr om (2008a), who study
a more stylized model. We now turn our attention to adding open-economy features to the
model.
4.2 Introducing open-economy channels
We rst introduce the open-economy transmission channels, but keep the domestic shocks as
the only source of uctuations. Accordingly, the reference model is given by equations (1){
14(17), but we shut down the shocks to the imported price markup ("
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t ), and the foreign exchange risk premium ("
q
t). In this specication, the three
domestic shocks, as well as monetary policy interventions, have additional eects on the
economy through imported-goods ination and the real exchange rate.
Figures 2{3 show impulse responses to these three shocks, and Panel (b) of Tables 3{5
show the corresponding results on overall volatility in the model.
In general, the impulse responses for the non-robust policy reveal that the central bank
actively uses the open-economy transmission channels to stabilize the economy. For instance,
after a technology shock, the central bank lowers the interest rate, leading to a real exchange
rate depreciation and higher import-price ination. Similarly, after a consumption preference
shock, the higher interest rate leads to a real exchange rate appreciation, which reduces
import-price ination and therefore osets the impact of higher domestic-price ination on
the consumer price index. As monetary policy in the open economy has a more powerful
impact than in a closed economy, the central bank can be less active in its interest rate
adjustments in response to these shocks.
Following a price markup shock, the open-economy features instead serve to make the
central bank behave more aggressively. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates to reduce
output and marginal costs. But the real exchange rate appreciation implies that a given
interest rate increase has a smaller impact on consumption and output and, as a consequence,
the central bank needs to tighten policy more aggressively to stabilize ination.
Overall, when the central bank is able to exploit the open-economy transmission channels,
it is able to better stabilize the economy after shocks. Therefore, with the non-robust policy,
output and ination are more stable than in the closed economy, and loss is about 50 percent
lower, see Table 3. Central bank robustness against model misspecication has similar eects
to those in the closed economy, although the central bank now also fears that the exchange
rate may be more volatile than the reference model would suggest. When the central bank is
robust, as in the closed economy, it fears that ination and output are more volatile causing
it to respond more aggressively to shocks. But the open-economy channels also help the
central bank counteract misspecication, so the specication errors are less damaging than in
the closed economy: in the approximating model, loss is 60 percent higher than with rational
expectations, compared to an almost doubling in loss in the closed economy. This increase
in loss is largely due to a rise in output volatility, with small eects from CPI ination and
the interest rate.
Relative to the pseudo-closed economy, the main implications for robust monetary policy
remain largely unaltered. The central bank continues to fear that shocks will have larger and
more persistent eects on domestic ination than they do in the reference model. As we will
see next, however, introducing the open-economy shocks creates new sources of specication
15errors and has a substantial impact on the robust monetary policy.
4.3 The inuence of import price markup shocks
We next introduce the import price markup shock. Figures 4{5 show the impulse responses
following an import price markup shock and, for comparison, the equivalent responses for
a domestic markup shock. Of course, under the non-robust policy, the response to the
domestic markup shock is identical to the case with only domestic shocks in Figure 2. But
with the robust policy, the worst-case specication errors are dierent, as the \evil agent" will
reallocate the distortions when there is a fourth shock in the model. (The robust responses
to the preference shock and the technology shock are still very similar to the earlier case,
so these are not shown.) Panel (c) of Tables 3{5 show the corresponding results on overall
volatility in the model.
After a positive shock to the import price markup, imported ination increases. To
oset this impact on import price ination (and therefore CPI ination), the central bank
needs to reduce the law-of-one-price gap. It achieves this by using tighter monetary policy
to generate a real exchange rate appreciation. Since import prices do not adjust one-for-
one with the real exchange rate, there will be a negative deviation from the law of one
price, and over time, import price ination will return to steady state (with a long period of
overshooting). The tighter monetary policy also reduces output, but domestic price ination
increases, because a small improvement in the terms of trade pushes up marginal costs.
Under the robust policy, the central bank is highly concerned with distortions to the
import price Phillips curve, making distortions to the domestic ination equation less promi-
nent. Following an import price markup shock, the central bank fears that the real exchange
rate will appreciate much more strongly than in the reference model, so much as to reverse
the eects of the shock on import price ination. As a consequence, the central bank does
not raise the interest rate as much as in the reference model, but instead initially lowers the
interest rate before generating a modest tightening. The strong real exchange rate appreci-
ation leads to a larger fall in output, but to an increase in domestic ination, again due to
movements in marginal cost. The overall eects of robustness on CPI ination are however
modest.
Panel (c) of Table 3 shows that the import price markup shock generates considerable
volatility, with loss increasing by 75 percent relative to when there are only domestic shocks.
Fears for model misspecication serve to increase the volatility of output and the real ex-
change rate, but again have only small eects on CPI ination and the interest rate. Tables 4
and 5 reveal that the distortions to the two ination equations are large, while the others
are, as before, extremely small. The import price markup shock is thus responsible for a
16large part of the volatility of the small open economy, making the import price Phillips curve
a key concern as a source of model misspecication.
4.4 The inuence of foreign shocks
As a next step, we introduce the shocks originating in the foreign economy, continuing, how-
ever, to assume that there are no shocks to the interest parity condition. Our experiments
show that the responses to the domestic shocks and the import price markup shock remain
essentially unaltered. Consequently, Figures 6{7 show only the impulse responses to the
foreign shocks.
Following a shock to foreign output, the foreign interest rate increases. As a consequence,
domestic output, marginal costs, and domestic ination all rise. In response, the central
bank increases the interest rate, causing the real exchange rate to appreciate, which drives
down import price ination and eventually also CPI ination.
After a foreign ination shock, the foreign interest rate increases and foreign output falls.
Facing lower foreign demand and higher foreign interest rates, domestic output falls and the
real exchange rate depreciates. The exchange rate depreciation causes imported ination
and CPI ination increase. The central bank tightens monetary policy, leading to even lower
domestic output, marginal cost, and domestic ination, which stabilizes CPI ination.
Following a foreign interest rate shock, the real exchange rate depreciates causing do-
mestic output and marginal costs to fall, while putting upward pressure on import price
ination. Again, the central bank needs to tighten monetary policy to reduce domestic
ination and oset the eects on CPI ination.
Overall, the eects of foreign shocks on the domestic economy are modest and for this
reason the robust central bank does not greatly fear distortions to this nexus of the model.
Panel (d) of Tables 4 and 5 also show that there are essentially no distortions to the foreign
equations and that the other distortions remain largely unaected by the introduction of
foreign shocks.
4.5 The complete open-economy model
Finally we add the foreign exchange risk premium shock, "
q
t. Interestingly, introducing this
shock has virtually no eects on the robust responses to the other shocks. For this reason,
Figure 8 shows only the impulse responses to the risk premium shock.
A positive shock to the exchange rate risk premium leads to a large real appreciation, so
import price ination falls substantially, while marginal cost and domestic ination increase.
The central bank then needs to cut the interest rate to oset the real appreciation and
increase CPI ination. Somewhat surprisingly, introducing a preference for robustness has
17fairly small eects on the behavior of the model. The real exchange rate depreciates slightly
more, with larger eects on import price ination and domestic ination. Therefore, the
central bank needs to cut the interest rate more aggressively.
Table 3 shows that introducing the exchange rate shock leads to increased volatility in the
real exchange rate, imported ination, and interest rate, with small eects on CPI ination
and output. The fear of misspecication still has large eects on the volatility of the real
exchange rate and output, and the robust policy causes loss to rise by some 60 percent relative
to the non-robust policy. However, Tables 4 and 5 reveal that the worst-case speccation
errors to the interest rate parity condition are one order of magnitude smaller than those
to the two Phillips curves, and the conditional variance of the risk premium shock is hardly
distorted at all. Thus, the additional volatility under the robust policy comes mainly from
the fear of distortions to the Phillips curves rather than to the exchange rate.
5 Conclusion
We study the eects of model uncertainty on monetary policy in a small open-economy.
We have done this incrementally, moving from a pseudo-closed economy model to an open
economy model, adding structure at each step. Along the way we have demonstrated that
a robust central bank in a closed economy fears mainly that ination and output shocks
will have larger and more persistent eects on ination than they do in the reference model.
Fearing this persistence, the robust central bank responds aggressively to shocks, giving rise
to less ination volatility but more output volatility than the non-robust policy.
We have also shown that the open-economy transmission channels per se do not have
a large eect on the robust policy. If the only shocks in the economy are to domestic
output and ination, then the conclusions from the closed-economy model remain largely
unaltered: the robust central bank fears mainly that the equation for domestic ination
might be misspecied, because distortions to the Phillips curve pose a dicult stabilization
problem for the central bank. But the open-economy transmission channels help the central
bank to stabilize the economy after shocks, lowering the volatility of all variables.
Introducing shocks to imported-goods price ination adds signicantly to the size of
business cycle uctuations. Adding shocks to the foreign economy or the foreign exchange
risk premium, on the other hand, has modest eects. The robust central bank in the open
economy therefore mainly fears misspecication in the relationships determining import-
price ination and domestic-price ination, that is the Phillips curves in the import and
domestic sectors.
These results suggest that understanding the nature of price setting and the impact of
exchange rate movements on import prices (that is, the degree of exchange rate pass-through)
18should be a key concern for central banks in small open economies. It seems less crucial to
understand the determination of the exchange rate itself, or the nature of deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity.
The nding that deviations from uncovered interest rate parity are not very damaging, nor
very vulnerable to model misspecication, depends partly on the assumption that monetary
policy is set with commitment. The central bank then has considerable inuence over private
sector expectations, which helps it to control the exchange rate. Although full commitment
may not be a perfectly realistic assumption, neither is full discretion. Many central banks
in small open economies have explicit ination targets and use very transparent monetary
policy procedures. Many also publish forecasts of key variables, such as ination, output
growth, or even the short-term interest rate. These strategies have developed as a means
to better anchor private expectations. To the extent that such strategies are successful in
facilitating commitment on the part of the central bank, they may also allow central banks
to be less concerned about deviations from interest rate parity.
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21Table 1: Structural parameter values
Description Notation Value
Calibrated structural parameters
Share of foreign goods in consumption  0:185
Discount factor  0:99
Elasticity of risk premium to net foreign assets  0:01
Estimated structural parameters
Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution  1:309
Inverse elasticity of labor supply ' 1:1157
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods  0:5824
Habit parameter h 0:33
Domestic price Calvo parameter d 0:7935
Import price Calvo parameter f 0:5511
Domestic price indexation parameter d 0:0499
Import price indexation parameter f 0:0693
Shock persistence parameters
Technology shock a 0:6936
Preference shock g 0:9257
Import price markup shock f 0:9352
Risk premium shock q 0:9384
Shock standard deviations
Technology shock a 0:3665
Preference shock g 0:1610
Domestic price markup shock d 0:7690
Import price markup shock f 1:5769
Risk premium shock q 0:3470
Note: This table shows parameters estimated by Justiniano and Preston (2008) on quarterly Australian
data from 1984:I to 2007:I, except d which is estimated by Adolfson, Las een, Lind e, and Villani (2008)
on quarterly Swedish data from 1993:I to 2005:III. The parameters are median values from the estimated
posterior distribution.
22Table 2: Parameter values for foreign economy VAR
Notation Value
VAR parameters
B1 0:3242 0:0558 0:1308
 0:1162 1:0378 0:1678
0:0807 0:1098 1:1031







Note: This table shows parameters estimated by Justiniano and Preston (2008) on quarterly Australian data
from 1984:I to 2007:I. The parameters are median values from the estimated posterior distribution.
23Table 3: Unconditional standard deviations and loss in dierent versions of the model
Standard deviation Loss




t yt qt ~ rt
(a) Closed-economy version
RE 1:150 2:675 0:888 0:381 1:679
WO 1:388 2:899 1:630 0:552 3:159
AP 1:388 2:900 1:618 0:551 3:141
(b) Open-economy model with only domestic shocks
RE 0:722 1:906 2:443 0:729 0:776 0:833 0:510 0:825
WO 0:813 1:994 2:635 1:235 1:169 1:090 0:630 1:330
AP 0:814 1:994 2:636 1:235 1:162 1:090 0:630 1:324
(c) Open-economy model with only domestic and import price markup shocks
RE 0:763 1:949 2:467 2:841 1:425 3:389 0:633 1:450
WO 0:803 1:983 2:617 2:623 3:890 5:027 0:682 4:490
AP 0:801 1:983 2:607 2:470 2:008 5:046 0:669 2:352
(d) Open-economy model without exchange rate shock
RE 0:767 1:953 2:479 3:230 1:437 3:475 0:691 1:475
WO 0:808 1:989 2:632 3:142 3:951 5:105 0:737 4:602
AP 0:806 1:989 2:622 3:014 2:026 5:124 0:724 2:394
(e) Open-economy model with all shocks
RE 0:808 2:002 2:669 6:679 1:475 4:642 1:139 1:650
WO 0:866 2:063 2:818 7:099 3:423 6:022 1:252 4:491
AP 0:864 2:064 2:809 7:057 2:087 6:039 1:210 2:653
Note: This table shows the unconditional standard deviations of key variables and expected loss in ve
versions of the open-economy model when monetary policy and specication errors are set with commit-
ment. \RE" represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy, \WO" is
the outcome in the worst-case equilibrium with robust policy, \AP" is the outcome in the approximating




t ; ~ rt are annualized quarterly domestic and
import price ination and one-period interest rate, respectively. The loss function is given by equation (45)
with  = 0:99,  = 0:5, and  = 0:1; the preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error
probability of 0:2.

















(b) Open-economy model with only domestic shocks
2:310 7 2:010 4 0:012
(c) Open-economy model with only domestic and import price markup shocks
1:010 7 7:610 4 0:027 0:039
(d) Open-economy model without exchange rate shock
1:110 7 0:810 4 0:028 0:040 2:910 6 1:510 4 4:410 5
(e) Open-economy model with all shocks
2:710 7 5:310 4 0:019 0:025 2:810 6 7:210 5 1:110 4 2:910 3
Note: This table shows the unconditional variances of worst-case specication errors in ve versions of
the open-economy model when monetary policy and specication errors are set with commitment. The
preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.
















0:026 0:134 0:591 2:487 0:122 0:230 0:013 0:120
(a) Closed-economy version
0:026 0:135 0:621
(b) Open-economy model with only domestic shocks
0:026 0:135 0:634
(c) Open-economy model with only domestic and import price markup shocks
0:026 0:134 0:605 2:572
(d) Open-economy model without exchange rate shock
0:026 0:134 0:605 2:573 0:122 0:230 0:013
(e) Open-economy model with all shocks
0:026 0:134 0:604 2:567 0:122 0:230 0:013 0:121
Note: This table shows the impact of worst-case specication errors on the variances of shocks in ve versions
of the open-economy model when monetary policy and specication errors are set with commitment. The
preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.











































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to shocks (of one standard deviation) in the closed-
economy version of the model when monetary policy and specication errors are set with commitment. \RE"
represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy, \AP" is the outcome in
the approximating equilibrium with robust policy. The ination rate is the annualized quarterly change in
the consumer price level, the interest rate is expressed in annualized terms. The preference for robustness is
chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.










































































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to shocks (of one standard deviation) in the
open-economy model with only domestic shocks when monetary policy and specication errors are set with
commitment. \RE" represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy,
\AP" is the outcome in the approximating equilibrium with robust policy. The ination rates are the
annualized quarterly change in the respective price level. The preference for robustness is chosen to produce
a detection error probability of 0:2.









































































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to shocks (of one standard deviation) in the
open-economy model with only domestic shocks when monetary policy and specication errors are set with
commitment. \RE" represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy,
\AP" is the outcome in the approximating equilibrium with robust policy. The interest rate is expressed in
annualized terms. The preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.
29Figure 4: Impulse responses to markup shocks in open-economy model with domestic shocks





































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to domestic and imported price markup shocks
(of one standard deviation) in the open-economy model with domestic shocks and shocks to the import price
markup when monetary policy and specication errors are set with commitment. \RE" represents the out-
come with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy, \AP" is the outcome in the approximating
equilibrium with robust policy. The ination rates are the annualized quarterly change in the respective
price level. The preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.
30Figure 5: Impulse responses to markup shocks in open-economy model with domestic shocks










































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to domestic and imported price markup shocks
(of one standard deviation) in the open-economy model with domestic shocks and shocks to the import
price markup when monetary policy and specication errors are set with commitment. \RE" represents the
outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy, \AP" is the outcome in the approxi-
mating equilibrium with robust policy. The interest rate is expressed in annualized terms. The preference
for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.







































































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to foreign shocks (of one standard deviation) in
the open-economy model without exchange rate shocks when monetary policy and specication errors are
set with commitment. \RE" represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary
policy, \AP" is the outcome in the approximating equilibrium with robust policy. The ination rates are the
annualized quarterly change in the respective price level. The preference for robustness is chosen to produce
a detection error probability of 0:2.














































































































































Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to foreign shocks (of one standard deviation) in
the open-economy model without exchange rate shocks when monetary policy and specication errors are set
with commitment. \RE" represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust monetary policy,
\AP" is the outcome in the approximating equilibrium with robust policy. The interest rate is expressed in
annualized terms. The preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.
























































   Interest rate  
Note: The gure shows impulse responses of key variables to the foreign exchange risk premium shock (of
one standard deviation) in the open-economy model with all shocks when monetary policy and specication
errors are set with commitment. \RE" represents the outcome with rational expectations and non-robust
monetary policy, \AP" is the outcome in the approximating equilibrium with robust policy. The ination
rates are the annualized quarterly change in the respective price level, the interest rate is expressed in
annualized terms. The preference for robustness is chosen to produce a detection error probability of 0:2.
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